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NO ROOM FOR SQUATTERS:
ALASKA’S ADVERSE POSSESSION
LAW
JENNIE MORAWETZ*
ABSTRACT
In 2003, the Alaska Legislature dramatically changed Alaska’s adverse
possession law. Alaska’s new law curtails the application of adverse
possession in a way that is more stringent than any other state’s law. This
Note summarizes Alaska’s adverse possession law prior to 2003 and discusses
how it was changed in 2003 by the passage of Senate Bill 93. The Note then
explores some implications of the new law: the ability to extinguish but not
create private easements by prescription, the importance of recording, and the
potential for a “good faith squatter” to lose land she believes is hers.

INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 2003, the Alaska Senate Judiciary Committee met to
discuss Senate Bill 93, the goal of which was to “repeal the Doctrine of
Adverse Possession in the case of ‘bad faith’ trespassers, giving private
property owner’s [sic] security in knowing their property cannot be
taken by squatters.”1 The traditional doctrine of adverse possession
allows adverse possessors to gain title to property possessed in a
continuous, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile manner2 for a certain

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. and M.E.M. expected 2013; Stanford
University, B.S. 2007. The author would like to thank Professor William A.
Reppy, Jr. for his guidance throughout the research and writing process.
1. Sponsor Statement for CS for SB 93 (JUD), ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE’S
MAJORITY
ORG.,
http://www.akrepublicans.org/wagoner/23/spst/wago_sb093.php (May 9,
2003) [hereinafter Sponsor Statement].
2. The specific requirements vary by statute, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60503 (2009) (listing open, exclusive, and continuous as requirements), and
common law, see, e.g., Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 77–78 (Ky. 2010) (stating
that adverse possession is “an amalgam of statutory and common law” and that
for the statute of limitations to transfer title to an adverse possessor in Kentucky
the common law requirements of hostile, actual, exclusive, continuous, open,
and notorious must be met).
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number of years.3 The doctrine has over 800 years of common law
history,4 and it had over 100 years of history in Alaska prior to 2003.5
Nevertheless, Jon Tillinghast—legal counsel for Sealaska Corporation,
the author of Senate Bill 93—boldly declared to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, “Justice Brandeis said that states serve as laboratories for
improvement of our laws. . . . Alaska is the first state to take a hard look
at . . . whether [adverse possession] serves any continuing social
utility.”6 The house and senate had no trouble deciding that, at least in
the case of “bad faith squatters,” adverse possession served no
continuing utility,7 and the Governor signed Senate Bill 93 into law on
July 17, 2003.8
Prior to 2003, the Alaska Supreme Court’s adverse possession
jurisprudence took Alaska’s unique circumstances into account in a way
that was perhaps more favorable to adverse possessors than to record
owners. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that the
exclusivity and continuity of an adverse possession are determined in
light of the character of the land in question and how an average owner
would use the land.9 In the rural areas that constitute the vast majority
of Alaska, the court has held that the continuity requirement may be met
when the use is seasonal,10 and the exclusivity requirement may be met
even though the adverse possessor allowed clamdiggers to use the
property.11 Likewise, the court has held that lesser acts than would be
required in urban areas may be sufficient to establish open possession in
rural areas.12 Practically speaking, these lesser requirements may have
made it easier for adverse possessors to gain title to rural land in Alaska.
In addition, by focusing on the conduct of the adverse possessor, the
court may have overlooked the fact that a record owner’s use of the land

3. The number of years is set out in state statutes of limitation. See
discussion infra Part II.
4. See discussion infra Part I.
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. S.B. 93-Adverse Possession, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 23rd
Leg. (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter 4/16/03 Minutes] (statement of Jon Tillinghast,
legal counsel for Sealaska Corporation).
7. The vote in the senate was 15-5. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess.
1281 (May 9, 2003). The vote in the house was 28-5, with seven members not
voting. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1924 (May 19, 2003).
8. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1841 (Aug. 20, 2003).
9. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990).
10. Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 21 (Alaska 2001).
11. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831 (Alaska
1974).
12. Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977).
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also depends on its character.13 Although it is not at all clear that prior to
2003 bad faith squatters were running rampantly around rural Alaska
taking advantage of Alaska’s adverse possession law,14 the Alaska
Legislature felt a need to provide record owners with additional
protections. With Senate Bill 93, the legislature sought to remove “the
harsh burden of policing . . . large expansive lands to insure [sic] that a
squatter has not taken up residency.”15
The statutory revisions in Senate Bill 93 effected sweeping changes
to Alaska’s adverse possession law. However, these changes have gone
relatively unnoticed.16 Moreover, the Alaska Supreme Court has not yet
had the opportunity to define the exact contours of the revised statutes,
so it is still unclear how the changes will play out in practice. This Note
is an attempt to clarify Alaska’s adverse possession law and to point out
some of the possible implications of the 2003 revisions. It begins by
briefly examining the historical roots of adverse possession. Because
much of Alaska’s pre-2003 adverse possession law will still be relevant
under the revised statutes, Part II critically examines Alaska’s adverse
possession law as it existed prior to 2003. Part III discusses the 2003
revisions, and Part IV examines some of the implications of those
revisions.

13. See Alan Romero, Rural Property Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 765, 783–84
(2010) (“[S]ome courts seem to recognize how certain rural qualities may affect
the possessor’s conduct, but overlook or disregard how those same qualities
may likewise affect the title owner’s conduct.”).
14. None of the reported Alaska Supreme Court adverse possession
decisions have involved an adverse possessor who went onto someone else’s
land without any belief in ownership with the goal of gaining title. This fact was
noted by attorney Ronald L. Baird in a House Judiciary Committee meeting.
Baird argued the squatter that Senate Bill 93 contemplated was “mythical.” See
S.B. 93-Adverse Possession, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (May
18, 2003) [hereinafter 5/18/03 Minutes II] (statement of Ronald L. Baird, attorney
at law).
15. S.B. 93-Adverse Possession, ALASKA S. LABOR & COMMERCE COMM.
MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter 3/11/03 Minutes] (statement of
Amy Seitz, staff to Senator Wagoner). More recently the legislature passed an act
providing that “land use allowed by a landowner for a recreational activity
without charge may not form the basis of a claim for adverse possession,
prescriptive easement, or a similar claim.” Recreating and Recreational
Areas−Landowners−Immunity, Liability for Misconduct, Claims, and Use
Easements, 2008 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 116 (codified at ALASKA STAT. §
09.65.202(e) (2010)). The only exception is actions brought under section
09.45.052(d) of the Alaska Statutes, id., which is discussed in Part III.B, infra.
16. This Author is aware of no law review articles and only one newspaper
article discussing the revisions.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND ITS
JUSTIFICATIONS

The traditional adverse possession doctrine has its roots in early
English statutes of limitations that barred actions to recover possession
of land after a certain amount of time had passed.17 Today, all American
states have statutes of limitation requiring that actions to recover land be
brought within a certain amount of time.18 Most American statutes of
limitation do not expressly state that the former owner can lose title to
an adverse possessor after the running of the statute.19 However, courts
have construed the statutes to transfer perfect title to adverse
possessors.20 The ability to gain title via adverse possession originated at
a time when title and possession were inseparable.21 Consequently, to
show an adverse possession was sufficient to be equated with
ownership, and thus that the true owner had a cause of action against
the adverse possessor throughout the statutory period, a modern
adverse possessor must generally prove her possession was actual,
adverse, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted
for the statutory period.22
Traditional justifications for the doctrine of adverse possession
include barring “stale” claims, punishing owners for their neglect,
encouraging the development of land, and quieting title.23 The Alaska
Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he adverse possession statutes keep stale cases out of the
courts . . . . They exist because of a belief “that title to land
should not long be in doubt, that society will benefit from
someone’s making use of land the owner leaves idle, and that

17. 3 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.1 (A.
James Casner ed., 1952). Statutes of limitation existed in England as early as the
thirteenth century. Id.
18. See 10 BUDDY O. H. HERRING ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 87.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 1995) (listing statutes of
limitation for all fifty states). The statutory periods range from five years to forty
years. Id.
19. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 15.1.
20. See, e.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904) (“The lapse of time
limited by such statutes not only bars the remedy, but it extinguishes the right,
and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder.” (quoting Leffingwell v. Warren,
67 U.S. 599, 605 (1862))).
21. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 87.04.
22. Id.; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 15.3. The specific
requirements vary by state. See supra note 2.
23. CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 83–96 (1961).
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third persons who come to regard the occupant as owner may
be protected.”24
Some modern scholars have suggested that the doctrine of adverse
possession should be reformed because many of these traditional
rationales are no longer relevant.25 Others have criticized adverse
possession on the ground that it encourages the development—“and
thus environmental degradation—of wild lands,”26 a concern
particularly applicable to Alaska. Finally, in response to concerns about
the potential inequity of adverse possession, a few legislatures in other
states have taken steps to curb its application.27 However, none have
been quite so bold as the Alaska Legislature.

24. Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Alaska 1977) (quoting
William B. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L.
REV. 53, 53 (1960)). Along the same lines, in Dillingham Commercial Company v.
City of Dillingham, the court stated that the rationale for adverse possession
statutes is the utility in promptly ending controversies “and in stabilizing long
continued property uses.” 705 P.2d 410, 416 (Alaska 1985).
25. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith”
Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1040–41 (2006) (stating that adverse
possession is now best suited to the niche goal of transferring land to parties that
value it more than the owners); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse
Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2471–73 (2001) (suggesting reform of adverse
possession law based on a loss-aversion rationale because “[r]ationales that
easily justified the ancient English doctrine of adverse possession have been
undermined”).
26. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse
Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 816 (1994). Sprankling also argued that
American courts tended to make it easier to adversely possess wild lands than
developed lands. Instead of requiring that adverse possessors do acts that would
afford the true owner constructive notice, the courts instead require only that
adverse possessors “use the land in the same manner that a reasonable owner
would, in light of its nature, character and location.” Id. at 825–31. The Alaska
Supreme Court has used this language in its opinions. See infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 688 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41101 (2010)) (amending Colorado’s adverse possession statute to require a
heightened burden of proof on adverse possessors, to require adverse possessors
to prove a good faith belief in ownership, and to give courts the discretion to
award damages to the person losing title); 1989 Or. Laws ch. 1069 (codified at
OR. REV. STAT. § 105.620 (2009)) (amending Oregon’s adverse possession statute
to require an honest belief in ownership).
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II. ADVERSE POSSESSION LAW IN ALASKA BEFORE 2003
A.

The Statutes Prior to 2003

Alaska has two statutes governing adverse possession. Portions of
these statutes existed before the 2003 amendments and were unchanged
by the 2003 amendments. These portions read as follows:
Sec. 09.10.030. Actions to recover real property.
(a) [A] person may not bring an action for the recovery of real
property or for the recovery of the possession of it unless the
action is commenced within 10 years. An action may not be
maintained . . . for the recovery unless it appears that the
plaintiff, an ancestor, a predecessor, or the grantor of the
plaintiff was seized or possessed of the premises in question
within 10 years before the commencement of the action.28
Sec. 09.45.052. Adverse Possession.
(a) The uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real
property under color and claim of title for seven years or
more . . . is conclusively presumed to give title to the property
except as against the state or the United States.29
The language of section 09.10.030(a) of the Alaska Statutes, as set
forth above, became part of Alaska’s laws in 1884 when the Alaska
Organic Act made the “general laws” of Oregon applicable to Alaska.30
The statutory language remained the same after Alaska became an
official territory in 191231 and after Alaska became a state in 1959.32 The

28. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(a) (2010).
29. Id. § 09.45.052(a).
30. An Act Providing for a Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat.
24, 25–26 (1884). This Act incorporated Oregon’s statute of limitations. See HILL’S
ANN. LAWS OF OR., ch. I, tit. II, § 4 (1887), which is identical to ALASKA STAT. §
09.10.030(a). In addition, the Alaska Organic Act incorporated Oregon adverse
possession law based on this statute of limitations. See Pioneer Mining Co. v.
Pac. Coal Co., 4 Alaska 463, 477 (1912) (noting in an adverse possession case that
Alaska adopted Oregon court decisions rendered prior to the adoption of
Oregon’s laws in the Alaska Code). Over sixty years after the Alaska Organic
Act was passed, the Ninth Circuit noted that Alaska’s statute was copied from
Oregon and relied on Oregon precedent to recognize the adverse possession
doctrine of “tacking.” Ringstad v. Grannis, 171 F.2d 170, 174 (9th Cir. 1948).
31. See COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF ALASKA, tit. XIII, ch. 2, § 836
(1913).
32. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1962).
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language of section 09.45.052(a) of the Alaska Statutes has a similarly
long history in Alaska,33 though it did not come from Oregon.34
Courts have construed these two statutes to give adverse
possessors title to privately owned land35 when the land is occupied for
the statutory period under certain conditions.36 An adverse possessor
can tack her adverse possession to that of a predecessor as long as there
is privity.37 Privity exists when there is “continuous possession by
mutual consent.”38 Unlike many other states, Alaska does not have a
statute that tolls the running of the statute of limitations when the true
owner is a minor or under a disability when the adverse possessor
enters the land.39 Also, although the Alaska Supreme Court has not
previously addressed the issue, it would likely hold—as most states
have—that the statutory period does not begin to run against the holder
of a future interest until the future interest becomes possessory.40

33. Congress enacted the language of section 09.45.052 in 1900. See An Act
Making Further Provision for a Civil Government for Alaska, and for Other
Purposes, ch. 786, § 98, 31 Stat. 321, 493 (1900), which is verbatim identical to the
portion of section 09.45.052(a) written above.
34. Compare CARTER’S ANN. LAWS OF ALASKA, tit. II, ch. 2, § 4 (1900) (noting
that the predecessor to section 09.10.030(a) came from the laws of Oregon), with
tit. II, ch. 100, § 1042 (not tracing the predecessor of 09.45.052(a) to the laws of
Oregon).
35. Statutes generally exempt government owned property from adverse
possession. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.71.010 (2010) (no adverse possession against a
municipality); id. § 38.95.010 (no adverse possession against the state); see also
United States v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443, 446 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (generally no
adverse possession against the federal government). Some scholars have pointed
out the discrepancy in allowing government entities to adversely possess against
private individuals but not allowing private individuals to adversely possess
against the government. See, e.g., Andrew Dick, Making Sense Out of Nonsense: A
Response to Adverse Possession by Governmental Entities, 7 NEV. L.J. 348, 350–51
(2006). This discrepancy was used by Senator Wagoner to argue in favor of
Senate Bill 93. See Sponsor Statement, supra note 1 (“Under existing law, a person
is prohibited from taking government property by adverse possession. SB 93
simply accords some equal dignity and protection to private ownership
rights.”).
36. These conditions are discussed in Parts II.B.2 & 3, infra.
37. Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984).
38. Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1980).
39. For an example of another state’s statute, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.022 (West 2010).
40. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 4.113. The reason for this
rule is that the owner of a future interest has no present right to possession and
so has no cause of action against the adverse possessor. Id.
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The Alaska Supreme Court’s Pre-2003 Adverse Possession
Jurisprudence

1. Section 09.10.030(a)
On its face, section 09.10.030(a) of the Alaska Statutes lists two
requirements plaintiffs must meet in order to file suit to recover real
property: (1) the plaintiff must file suit within ten years, and (2) the
plaintiff or his predecessor in interest must have been “seized or
possessed” of the land sometime during the ten years preceding the
filing of the lawsuit. Requirement one is fairly straightforward, but
requirement two poses the question of what is meant by “seized or
possessed.” Seisin is an ancient concept rooted in English feudal law.41
In the thirteenth century, seisin was synonymous with possession.42
Over time the concepts of seisin and possession were separated,43 and
seisin came to refer to ownership of a freehold estate.44 Lessees merely
had possession, not seisin.45 Easements were considered “use” interests
in land, not possessory interests.46
The only insight into how the Alaska Supreme Court interprets the
phrase “seized or possessed” is contained in the 1977 case Shilts v.
Young.47 In Shilts, the trial court had equated seisin with physical
possession.48 The Alaska Supreme Court stated:
It is not necessary for a titleholder to be in physical possession
of land for any period of time in order to assert his rights.
[Section 09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes] states in part that an
action for recovery of real property may not be maintained
unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was “seized or possessed
of the premises in question within 10 years before the
commencement of the action.” The statute uses the term
“seized” in the sense of having legal title.49

41. 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 17.01(b).
42. Id.; 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 20 (3d ed. 1939).
43. See 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 17.01(b) (detailing
the historical understanding of seisin and possession).
44. Id.; 1 TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 42, § 20. Freehold estates include fee
simple estates and life estates. 1 TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 42, § 25.
45. 1 TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 42, § 20; 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 18, § 39.04.
46. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 60.02(c). Real covenants
and equitable servitudes are also considered non-possessory interests in land. Id.
vol. 4, § 39.04.
47. 567 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1977).
48. See id. at 775 n.22.
49. Id.
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In Shilts, the Alaska Supreme Court was most likely recognizing the
concept of “constructive seisin”—the idea that a record owner of a fee
estate need not have actual possession in order to have seisin. Although
Shilts had not been in physical possession of the property in question
within the last ten years,50 he had record title.51 Consequently, he had a
right to possession and so was constructively seized.52 The concept of
constructive seisin has long been recognized in American property
law,53 and the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested the concept might be
particularly applicable to remote pieces of property54 such as the one at
issue in Shilts.55 The cases cited by the Alaska Supreme Court in Shilts in
support of its statement that the term “seized” means “having legal
title” indicate that the court was recognizing the concept of constructive
seisin.56 However, although the court most likely adopted the more
plausible interpretation of section 09.10.030(a)—that “seized” refers to
owners of freehold estates and “possessed” refers to owners of leasehold
estates—it is possible to read Shilts as equating seisin with ownership of
any interest in land.57 But, since the phrase “seized or possessed” in

50. See id. at 771, 775 n.22.
51. Id. at 775 n.22.
52. See id.; see also infra note 56 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 268, 268 (1866) (stating that in
America there is generally no difference between actual and constructive seisin
and that conveyance by deed “carries the legal seisin, and gives constructive
possession to the grantee”). In Whitehead, the Texas Supreme Court used the
terms “seizin in deed” and “seizin in law,” see id., which refer to actual seisin
and constructive seisin, respectively. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (9th ed.
2009).
54. See Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. 229, 249 (1814) (holding the grantee of a
conveyance of wild or vacant lands has constructive seisin).
55. See Shilts, 567 P.2d at 771.
56. The court cited Williams v. Swango, 7 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. 1937), and Beneficial
Life Insurance Company v. Wakamatsu, 270 P.2d 830 (Idaho 1954). Shilts, 567 P.2d at
775 n.22. Both cases suggest that the court was recognizing that the legal owner
of a freehold estate has a right to possession and therefore need not have actual
possession in order to have seisin. See Beneficial Life, 270 P.2d at 834 (“[S]eizin
generally follows the legal title . . . .”); Williams, 7 N.E.2d at 309 (holding holder
of a reversionary interest did not have constructive seisin because she did not
have an immediate right to possession). The court also cited Carley v. Davis, 452
P.2d 772 (Okla. 1969). Shilts, 567 P.2d at 775 n.22. However, it is unclear to this
Author how Carley supports the proposition for which the Alaska Supreme
Court cited it.
57. Some modern commentators have suggested that in modern statutes,
seisin is usually synonymous with ownership. See, e.g., CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN
& SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 31 (3d ed.
2002). As an example, Moynihan and Kurtz cited Dial v. Dial, 38 N.E.2d 43 (Ill.
1941). MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra, at 31. In Dial, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that in the Probate Act, the Illinois Legislature “did not use the word ‘seized’ in
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section 09.10.030(a) dates back to at least 1884,58 there is a strong
argument that the intended meaning at the time the statutory language
was adopted was for “seized” to refer to owners of freehold estates and
for “possessed” to refer to owners of leasehold estates.
To summarize, section 09.10.030(a) imposes requirements on
plaintiffs who wish to file suit to recover property from an adverse
possessor. First, the plaintiff must have had title to a freehold estate in
the land (i.e. seisin) or have possessed the land as a lessee within the ten
years prior to the filing of the suit. Second, the plaintiff must file the suit
within ten years after the date on which the adverse possession began. If
the plaintiff does not file suit within ten years, then the plaintiff’s suit is
barred, and the adverse possessor may be able to gain title to the
property.
2. The Common Law Elements of Adverse Possession
In order for the statute of limitations contained in section
09.10.030(a) to transfer title to an adverse possessor, the adverse
possessor must have occupied the land in a continuous, open and
notorious, exclusive, and hostile manner for ten years or more, during
which time the true owner cannot have filed a lawsuit or done
something else to interrupt the adverse possession.59 An adverse
possessor can file a lawsuit under section 09.10.030(a) without reference
to another statute,60 such as the quiet title statute.61
In one of its earliest adverse possession decisions, the Alaska
Supreme Court stated, “[T]he main purpose of nearly all the [adverse
possession] requirements is essentially the same, that is, to put the
record owner on notice of the existence of an adverse claimant.”62 The
court has also suggested that a purpose of the requirements is to
overcome the presumption that the possession was with the true
owner’s permission and in subordination to his title, or in other words,

its technical sense, but meant thereby the same as if it had used the word
‘owned.’” 38 N.E.2d at 48.
58. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
59. See Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977) (“An
interruption of possession caused by the record owner . . . tolls the running of
the statute of limitations.”); Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519
P.2d 826, 830 & n.13 (Alaska 1974) (listing the elements of continuous, open,
notorious, exclusive, and hostile and noting that section 09.10.030(a) provides
“the method by which a claimant may establish a new title by adverse
possession”).
60. See McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska 1992) (treating the
plaintiff’s suit “as one brought under the statute of limitations”).
61. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.010 (2010).
62. Peters, 519 P.2d at 830.
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to prove that the possession was truly “adverse.”63 An adverse possessor
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that his possession met the
requirements.64 However, in analyzing whether an adverse possessor
met the requirements, courts consider “the character of the property”
and whether the adverse possessor used it “as ‘an average owner of
similar property would use and enjoy it.’”65 In adverse possession cases
involving undeveloped, wild land—a substantial portion of the land in
Alaska—the Alaska Supreme Court has not been stringent in
determining the degree of possession sufficient to meet the adverse
possession requirements,66 despite the fact that leniently interpreting the
elements does not further the goal of putting the record owner on
notice.67
In Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, the Alaska Supreme Court stated: “The
first three conditions—continuity, notoriety and exclusivity—describe
the physical requirements of the [adverse possession] doctrine.”68 To
establish continuity, an adverse possessor must show that he used the
land in question for ten years “as an average owner of similar property
would use it.”69 Alaska’s geography and climate make many pieces of
property unsuitable for winter use, so seasonal use may be sufficient to
establish continuity.70 If the record owner or a third party physically
interrupts the possession, continuity is destroyed.71

63. See Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579, 581 (Alaska 1969).
64. Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389, 391–92 (Alaska 1982).
65. See Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977)
(quoting 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 15.3).
66. See, e.g., Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309–10 (Alaska 1990)
(holding seasonal subsistence and recreational use of land sufficient to establish
title by adverse possession); Linck, 559 P.2d at 1053 (“We cannot expect the
possessor of uninhabited and forested land to do what the possessor of urban
residential land would do before we charge the record owner with notice.”); cf.
Grantland M. Clapacs, Note, “When in Nome . . .”: Custom, Culture and the
Objective Standard in Alaskan Adverse Possession Law, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 301, 304
(1994) (arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Nome v. Fagerstrom
“lowered the standard for determining the elements of adverse possession too
greatly”).
67. See Romero, supra note 13, at 787 (“If adverse possession of undeveloped
rural land may be less intensive . . . record owners of such rural land would have
to be more diligent in monitoring their property . . . . Furthermore, even greater
effort may be required when the land is forested, remote, or otherwise difficult
to monitor.”).
68. 799 P.2d at 309.
69. Id.
70. Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 21 (Alaska 2001).
71. Linck, 559 P.2d at 1052. In a prescriptive easement case, the Alaska
Supreme Court stated that interrupting the possession and negating continuity
would usually require physically blocking access to an easement. McDonald v.
Harris, 978 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1999). Presumably, a similar physical act would
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Similar to continuity, exclusivity is determined by considering how
an average owner would use the land in question, so complete
exclusivity is not required.72 For example, in Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl
Scout Council, Peters successfully gained title through adverse
possession by making regular use of the property in question; in
allowing clamdiggers to use the property, he “was merely acting as any
other hospitable landowner might.”73 The main purpose of the
exclusivity requirement seems to be to prove that the adverse possessor
was doing something to distinguish himself as an “owner” rather than
someone acting in common with the general public.74
Practically speaking, openness and notoriety are the same thing; a
fact the Alaska Supreme Court has implicitly recognized by conflating
the two requirements.75 “The function of the [open and notorious]
requirement is to afford the true owner an opportunity for notice. . . .
[A]ctual notice is not required; the true owner is charged with knowing
what a reasonably diligent owner would have known.”76 The possession
must be “reasonably visible”77 so that “if the owner visits property, he
[will] be put on notice and be able to assert his rights.”78 The Alaska
Supreme Court favors the use of the word “notorious” over the word
“open.”79 However, the use of the word “notorious” is misleading.80

be required in an adverse possession case. Of course, the record owner could
also interrupt the continuity by bringing a lawsuit within ten years.
72. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831 (Alaska
1974).
73. Id. at 828, 830–31. See also Vezey, 35 P.3d at 22 (allowing relatives to take
small quantities of rock from property did not destroy exclusivity); Nome 2000,
799 P.2d at 310 (allowing others to pick berries and fish on remote parcel of land
did not destroy exclusivity).
74. See Peters, 519 P.2d at 830 (“An owner would have no reason to believe
that a person was making a claim of ownership inconsistent with his own if that
person’s possession was not exclusive, but in participation with the owner or
with general public.”); see also Clapacs, supra note 66, at 312–13 (suggesting that
exclusivity works in conjunction with hostility to provide evidence that the
adverse possessor “intends to appropriate the land”).
75. See, e.g., Vezey, 35 P.3d at 20, 22 (listing “open and notorious” as an
element of adverse possession and then analyzing it as a single requirement).
76. Nome 2000, 799 P.2d at 309 n.7. If the true owner has actual notice, then
the notoriety requirement is met. See Vezey, 35 P.3d at 22.
77. Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska
1983).
78. Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Alaska 1977).
79. See, e.g., Vezey, 35 P.3d at 20, 22 (analyzing the “open and notorious”
requirement as the “notoriety” requirement). The preference for the word
notoriety could be due to the use of the term in section 09.45.052(a) of the Alaska
Statutes and the conflating of the standards for section 09.10.030(a) and section
09.45.052(a) cases. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010); text accompanying
notes 100–112, infra.
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There is in fact no requirement that the adverse possession be wellknown; rather, community repute is relevant to whether there was
enough evidence of possession to charge the true owner with inquiry
notice.81 Community repute of ownership without physical evidence of
possession is not sufficient to establish adverse possession.82
Consequently, it is more accurate to state that the possession must be
open, or “reasonably visible,” rather than “notorious.”
As with exclusivity and continuity, the same acts are not required
to establish open possession of rural or uninhabited lands as for urban
lots.83 In a rural area, an adverse possessor who planted a garden,
erected a barricade, posted a sign prohibiting hunting, granted an
easement, and picked up litter maintained sufficiently open possession
to charge the true owner with notice.84 Another rural adverse possessor
met the open requirement by building a picnic area, parking a camper
trailer, building an outhouse and fish rack, planting trees, and
constructing a reindeer shelter.85 However, a would-be adverse
possessor who flew over a piece of rural land several times a year and
went onto the property at least once per year to walk the boundaries did
not meet the requirement.86 In more urban settings, filling a slough with
tailings and using it for parking automobiles, constructing a trailer
court,87 and building a fence for a driveway88 were each sufficiently
open to establish title by adverse possession. However, a would-be
adverse possessor who rototilled, seeded, and mowed a portion of lawn
and used part of it as a volleyball court did not meet the “open”
requirement.89

80. Webster’s New World Dictionary defines “notorious” as “well-known” or
“publicly discussed.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 928 (Victoria Neufeldt
and David B. Guralnik eds., 3d College ed. 1988).
81. See Linck, 559 P.2d at 1053. If the community had notice, the record
owner probably should also have had notice. However, it is possible to imagine
a scenario in which an adverse possessor builds a cabin in the middle of a large
parcel of rural land and lives there for ten years. In this case, the record owner
would almost certainly be charged with notice, regardless of whether anyone
else in the area knew of the adverse possession.
82. Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977). Of course, community
repute that someone is asserting a right to a piece of land would likely originate
from physical evidence of possession.
83. Id.
84. Linck, 559 P.2d at 1051, 1053.
85. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 307–08, 310 (Alaska 1990).
86. Shilts, 567 P.2d at 772, 777.
87. Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 766, 768 (Alaska
1983).
88. Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3–4 (Alaska 1980).
89. Tenala, Ltd. v. Fowler, 921 P.2d 1114, 1121–22 (Alaska 1996).
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The final adverse possession requirement, hostility, is an objective
requirement that the adverse possessor act as if he owns the land.90
Whether the adverse possessor actually believes he owns the land and
his good or bad faith are irrelevant.91 By treating the land as an owner
would, the adverse possessor’s possession is sufficiently hostile to
overcome the presumption that he possessed the land in subordination
to the true owner’s title.92 Absent evidence of permission,93 the same
evidence that establishes that the adverse possessor occupied land with
the exclusivity, continuity, and openness of an average owner of similar
land will generally also establish that “the adverse possessor held the
land in such a way that his interest in the property was incompatible
with the record owner’s interest.”94 One notable exception is a tenant at
sufferance, who must perform some distinct act, other than nonpayment
of rent, to establish hostility.95 On the other end of the spectrum, in the
case of a parol gift of land, a donee’s claim to the property is
presumptively hostile to that of the donor.96
If the continuity, exclusivity, openness, and hostility elements are
met, then title to the extent of land “actually possessed” for the statutory
period automatically vests in the adverse possessor.97 In Vezey v. Green,
the Alaska Supreme Court stated: “Evidence of actual possession must
be sufficient to alert a reasonably diligent owner to the possessor’s
exercise of dominion and control.”98 Since this is essentially a
restatement of the purpose of the adverse possession elements,99 it
90. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 832 (Alaska
1974).
91. Id.; see also Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 310 (noting that
whether the defendants had a traditional Alaska Native mindset toward land
ownership was irrelevant to determining whether the defendants objectively
acted as if they owned the land).
92. Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 126 (Alaska 1961).
93. Permission requires more than acquiescence of the true owner; it
requires “acknowledgment by the possessor that he holds in subordination to
the owner’s title.” Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1984).
94. Glover v. Glover, 92 P.3d 387, 392 (Alaska 2004); see also Nome 2000, 799
P.2d at 310 (indicating that since the acts that established continuity, exclusivity,
and notoriety of the defendant’s possession were “consistent with ownership”
and since the plaintiff offered no proof that the defendant acted with anyone’s
permission, the defendant met the hostility requirement).
95. Glover, 92 P.3d at 393–94.
96. Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 24 (Alaska 2001). Similarly, in color of title
cases brought under section 09.45.052(a), discussed in Part II.B.3, infra, the
possession of a grantee is presumptively hostile to his grantor. Hubbard, 684 P.2d
at 848.
97. See Hubbard, 684 P.2d at 849; Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc.,
658 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska 1983).
98. 35 P.3d at 25.
99. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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stands to reason that the adverse possessor gets title to the extent of land
to which all the elements apply, although natural boundaries may also
be relevant.100
3. Section 09.45.052(a) and Color of Title
Unlike section 09.10.030(a), section 09.45.052(a) specifically lists
requirements an adverse possessor must meet in order to gain title by
adverse possession. The statute says that “[t]he uninterrupted adverse
notorious possession of real property under color and claim of title for
seven years or more . . . is conclusively presumed to give title.”101
Reading the statute literally, to gain title under section 09.45.052(a) an
adverse possessor must prove: (1) color of title, (2) continuity, (3)
hostility, and (4) notoriety.102 The word “conclusively” implies that these
are the only elements that must be met, so unlike claims based on
section 09.10.030(a), exclusivity is not required.103
In one of its earliest color of title decisions, Alaska National Bank v.
Linck, the Alaska Supreme Court stated:
[The three adjectives in section 09.45.052(a)] represent the three
concepts underlying the law of adverse possession: (1) the
possession must have been continuous and uninterrupted; (2)
the possessor must have acted as if he were the owner and not
merely one acting with the permission of the owner; and (3) the
possession must have been reasonably visible to the record
owner.”104
This statement simply elaborates on the meanings of the three
adjectives. The possession must be continuous, which implies
uninterrupted.105 It must be hostile, which means the possessor must
have acted as if he were the owner.106 Finally, it must be notorious, or

100. Vezey, 35 P.3d at 24.
101. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010).
102. Continuous is synonymous with uninterrupted, and hostile is
synonymous with adverse. See Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052–
53 (Alaska 1977) (interpreting “continuous” and “uninterrupted” as the same
requirement and “adverse” and “hostile” as the same requirement).
103. The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that it “presume[s] . . . every word
in [a] statute was intentionally included, and must be given some effect.”
Municipality of Anchorage v. Suzuki, 41 P.3d 147, 151 (Alaska 2002).
Furthermore, each word in a statute should be interpreted according to its
“common and approved usage.” ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.040 (2010). Employing
these rules of construction, giving effect to the word “conclusively” means that
exclusivity need not be proved to prevail under section 09.45.052(a).
104. 559 P.2d at 1052.
105. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
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open, which means reasonably visible to the record owner.107 Exclusivity
is not part of this statement, and in Linck exclusivity did not enter into
the court’s analysis.108 Moreover, the court has implicitly recognized that
the test presented above does not include exclusivity by using it to
decide cases involving prescriptive easements, which do not require
exclusivity.109
Unfortunately, two of the court’s decisions subsequent to Linck
muddied this important distinction between section 09.45.052(a) and
section 09.10.030(a). In a case decided just a few months after Linck, the
court stated that the plaintiff adverse possessor was required to prove
“open, notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile possession” under
either statute.110 A few years later, the court suggested that adverse
possessors must satisfy the same requirements under either statute and
then used the Linck test for a section 09.10.030(a) case.111 Although
several later cases seemed to once again recognize the distinction based
on the “exclusivity” element,112 a very recent Alaska Supreme Court
decision stated that plaintiffs must prove the same elements under both
statutes.113 The Alaska Supreme Court should explicitly recognize that
unlike claims based on section 09.10.030(a), claims based on section
09.45.052(a) do not require exclusivity.
For section 09.45.052(a) to apply, the adverse possessor must have
color of title. Three conditions establish color of title: (1) the adverse
possessor has a written document purporting to transfer title to him; (2)
the written document accurately describes the land claimed by the
adverse possessor; and (3) the adverse possession was in good faith.114
An adverse possessor meets the good faith requirement if he had “an
honest belief based on reasonable grounds that he had valid title to the
land when he entered it.”115 If the adverse possessor has color of title for

107. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
108. See 559 P.2d at 1050–54.
109. See, e.g., Interior Trails Pres. Coal. v. Swope, 115 P.3d 527, 529–30 (Alaska
2005).
110. Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 773 (Alaska 1977) (emphasis added).
111. Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 764–65 (Alaska
1983).
112. See, e.g., Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 20 (Alaska 2001) (using the elements
of continuous, open, exclusive, and hostile to decide a section 09.10.030(a) case);
Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 779–84 (Alaska 2000) (using the Linck test to
decide a section 09.45.052(a) case).
113. See Cowan v. Yeisley, 255 P.3d 966, 972 (Alaska 2011).
114. Snook, 12 P.3d at 780. It is worth nothing that a certificate of sale from a
tax sale does not serve as color of title. The possessor needs the tax deed, issued
after the owner’s right of redemption has expired, in order to have color of title.
Wells v. Noey, 380 P.2d 876, 879 (Alaska 1963).
115. Snook, 12 P.3d at 781.
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the entire statutory period,116 then the continuous, hostile, and open
adverse possession need only be for a period of seven years in order to
transfer title to the adverse possessor.117 The Alaska Supreme Court has
stated that the rationale for the shortened prescriptive period “is most
logically attributable to a belief that a person holding land under color of
title will be more likely to make improvements and otherwise commit
himself to that land.”118 When land is successfully adversely possessed
under color of title, the written evidence of color of title, rather than the
area physically possessed by the adverse possessor, determines the
extent of the land to which title is acquired.119
4. Prescriptive Easements
The law of prescriptive easements is nearly identical to the law of
adverse possession, except that prescriptive easements are based on use
rather than full possession.120 At the end of the prescriptive period, the
adverse user gets an easement rather than full title.121 In Alaska, section
09.10.030(a) has been relied on as authorizing courts to establish
prescriptive easements,122 and the test for prescriptive easements is
essentially identical to the Linck test for color of title cases.123 To establish
an easement by prescription: (1) the use must be continuous, (2) the user
must act as if she owns an easement and not as if she is using the land
with the permission of the fee owner (i.e. the use must be “hostile”), and
(3) the use must be reasonably visible to the fee owner (i.e. the use must
be “open”).124 Exclusivity is not a requirement to establish a prescriptive
easement.125 However, the Alaska Supreme Court has suggested that a

116. See Wells, 380 P.2d at 877–79 (holding Noey did not get title after seven
years of possession because he did not have color of title during the first two
years).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010).
118. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 466 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska
1970).
119. Id. at 817–18. An exception to this rule occurs when the record owner is
in actual possession of part of the property. Ault v. State, 688 P.2d 951, 955–56
(Alaska 1984).
120. McDonald v. Harris, 978 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1999); 7 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 60.03(b)(6)(i).
121. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 60.03(b)(6)(i).
122. McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska 1992).
123. Compare id., with supra text accompanying note 102.
124. See McGill, 839 P.2d at 397.
125. Id. at 398. In McGill v. Wahl, the court misleadingly noted that exclusivity
is relevant to determining whether the use was “under a claim of right.” Id.
“Claim of right” is not a separate element that must be proved in order to
establish an easement by prescription. See Nelson v. Green Constr. Co., 515 P.2d
1225, 1228 n.15 (Alaska 1973) (indicating that claim of right refers to whether an
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use might be so shared that it would be impossible to determine that a
prescriptive easement existed in a single individual.126 In this case, a
public prescriptive easement might be created.127
The continuity, hostility, and openness requirements are
interpreted similarly in the prescriptive easement context as in the
adverse possession context. What counts as continuous use depends on
the character of the land in question.128 For example, failure to plow and
use a road in winter in Fairbanks would not necessarily negate
continuity.129 The hostility requirement is met and the presumption of
permission is overcome if the user “contemplates uninterrupted future
use”130 and acts “as if he were claiming a permanent right to the
easement.”131 Finally, the openness requirement is met if the use would
have been noticed by a duly alert fee owner.132 If the fee owner knew of
the use, then the adverse possessor must be able to show that the fee
owner did not grant permission.133
In 1985, the Alaska Supreme Court held that public easements can
also be created by prescription.134 The requirements to establish a public
prescriptive easement are the same as for private prescriptive
easements.135 “The only difference is that a public prescriptive easement
requires qualifying use by the public, while a private prescriptive
adverse possession is hostile enough to overcome the presumption of
permission).
126. See McGill, 839 P.2d at 398. In McGill the court stated, “We are not so
persuaded that the . . . use of the roadway was so shared as to overcome the
presumption that the easement existed. [The adverse users] were the primary
and only consistent users of the roadway.” Id. A later case took this to mean that
the adverse user must be the primary user and that third parties can only be
occasional users. See McDonald v. Harris, 978 P.2d 81, 84 (Alaska 1999). Such an
interpretation seems at odds with the lack of an exclusivity requirement. A
better interpretation is probably that if a use is so shared, a public, rather than
private, prescriptive easement might be created. See infra note 127.
127. See Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 304–05 (Alaska 1985) (suggesting the
plaintiffs might want to ask for leave to amend their complaint to include a
public prescriptive easement claim because the disputed roadway was used by
several neighbors as well as members of the public).
128. McDonald, 978 P.2d at 83.
129. See Swift, 706 P.2d at 303.
130. Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Alaska 1993).
131. Swift, 706 P.2d at 303.
132. McDonald, 978 P.2d at 85.
133. Swift, 706 P.2d at 304.
134. Dillingham Commercial Co. v. City of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410, 416
(Alaska 1985).
135. See Daniel W. Beardsley, Public Prescriptive Rights across Private Lands,
ASLPS STANDARDS AND PRACTICE MANUAL 1 (1994), available at
http://www.alaskapls.org/standards/prescription.pdf (“[T]he requirements to
establish a public prescriptive easement are essentially the same as private
easements.”).
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easement requires qualifying use only by the private party.”136 Although
a public prescriptive easement gives the public at large the right to use
the easement, the public may only use the easement “for those types of
uses that led to its establishment” and “closely related ancillary uses.”137
For example, in Price v. Eastham, the court held that when a public
prescriptive easement was established for snowmachine use, other types
of users—such as hunters and berry-pickers—could not use the
easement without independently satisfying the public prescriptive
easement requirements.138

III. THE 2003 STATUTORY REVISIONS
A.

The Passage of Senate Bill 93

In 2003, at the request of Sealaska Corporation,139 Alaska Senator
Thomas H. Wagoner introduced Senate Bill 93 in order to “repeal the
Doctrine of Adverse Possession in the case of ‘bad faith’ trespassers.”140
The Anchorage Daily News quoted Senator Wagoner as stating:
Our law, right now, allows a person who has no claim of
ownership to squat on someone else’s property and, as a result
of their illegal trespass, the squatter could actually secure title
to the property they are squatting on. That is simply legal
thievery—to me, that is offensive and it needs to stop.”141
In his sponsor statement, Senator Wagoner suggested that adverse
possession was a relic of the Middle Ages that served no purpose in
present day Alaska.142
Shortly after the introduction of Senate Bill 93, in a meeting of the
Senate Labor and Commerce Standing Committee, Russell Dick, then
the Natural Resources Manager for Sealaska Corporation, discussed
how Senate Bill 93 would benefit Sealaska. He noted that Sealaska owns
136. Interior Trails Pres. Coal. v. Swope, 115 P.3d 527, 529 (Alaska 2005).
137. Price v. Eastham, 254 P.3d 1121, 1126 (Alaska 2011).
138. Id. at 1127.
139. 4/16/03 Minutes, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Wagoner). Sealaska
authored Senate Bill 93. Id. (statement of Jon Tillinghast). Its specific motivation
may have been a lengthy legal proceeding initiated to have a trespasser evicted
from Sealaska land. See 3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Russell Dick,
former Resources Manager of Sealaska).
140. Sponsor Statement, supra note 1.
141. Senate Passes Bill to Stop ‘Legal Thievery of Property,’ ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, May 14, 2003, at B9.
142. See Sponsor Statement, supra note 1 (“Adverse Possession was born some
800 years ago during the Middle Ages, but incredibly still applies in the State of
Alaska.”).
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hundreds of thousands of acres of land in southeast Alaska and that
policing that land was a substantial burden.143 Mr. Dick also noted that,
unlike Sealaska, private landowners might have very limited financial
resources to devote to policing their land.144 Amy Seitz, staff of Senator
Wagoner, suggested that adverse possession law was antiquated and
that it was unfair for private landowners to be subject to adverse
possession law when government entities are not.145
Pete Putzier, Assistant Attorney General, objected to the bill on the
grounds that it would impose undue hardship on the Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities, which he claimed frequently relied
on adverse possession to clear title to roads in order to get federal
money for road improvement projects.146 In addition, two interested
citizens said that while they supported doing away with “squatters’
rights,” they were concerned that the bill would eliminate prescriptive
easements, which they believed served important purposes.147
As Senate Bill 93 worked its way through various committee
meetings, concerns about private easements and rights-of-way were
often at the forefront of the discussions over whether adverse possession
still served any useful purpose. A land surveyor expressed concern that
many people in the Fairbanks Northstar Borough use driveways that
pass over someone else’s property, and they rely on adverse possession
to acquire rights to those driveways148—a concern echoed by Attorney
Ronald L. Baird.149 Surveyor Jim Colver expressed concern about the
private roads, trails, and driveways that provide access to patents,
fishing holes, cabins, and homes.150 Nevertheless, the only major
changes made to Senate Bill 93 as introduced were to add exceptions
dealing with good faith boundary disputes, acquisition of prescriptive

143. 3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Russell Dick). It is likely that
not all of Sealaska’s land was subject to adverse possession claims. Land
conveyed by the federal government to a Native individual or corporation
pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is exempt from adverse
possession claims so long as it is undeveloped, not leased, and not sold. 43
U.S.C. § 1636(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
144. 3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Russell Dick).
145. Id. (statement of Amy Seitz). Statutes generally bar adverse possession
of government land. See supra note 35.
146. 3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Pete Putzier).
147. Id. (statements of Millie Martin and Shirley Schollenberg).
148. 4/16/03 Minutes, supra note 6 (statement of Tom Scarborough).
149. Comm. Minutes on S.B. 93, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM.
MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (May 18, 2003) [hereinafter 5/18/03 Minutes I] (statement of
Ronald L. Baird).
150. 5/18/03 Minutes II, supra note 14 (statement of Jim Colver).
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easements by utilities, and state adverse possession of land for public
transportation and access.151
B.

The Changes to Sections 09.10.030 and 09.45.052

Following the passage of Senate Bill 93 in 2003, section 09.10.030 of
the Alaska Statutes was changed to read as follows:
Sec. 09.10.030. Actions to recover real property in 10 years.
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person may not bring
an action for the recovery of real property or for the recovery of
the possession of it unless the action is commenced within 10
years. An action may not be maintained under this subsection for
the recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, an ancestor, a
predecessor, or the grantor of the plaintiff was seized or
possessed of the premises in question within 10 years before
the commencement of the action.
(b) An action may be brought at any time by a person who was seized
or possessed of the real property in question at some time before the
commencement of the action or whose grantor or predecessor was
seized or possessed of the real property in question at some time before
commencement of the action, and whose ownership interest in the real
property is recorded under AS 40.17, in order to
(1) quiet title to that real property; or
(2) eject a person from that real property.152
Section 09.10.030(b) applies to record owners whose ownership interests
are properly recorded in the Department of Natural Resources
recorder’s office in the recording district where the land is located.153 It is
available to a record owner in an action against an adverse possessor so
long as the record owner’s cause of action was not barred by section
09.10.030(a) as it read before July 17, 2003.154 In other words, if the
adverse possessor had possessed for ten years by July 17, 2003, then the
record owner would have no recourse, since title would have
automatically transferred to the adverse possessor at the end of the
statutory period.155 However, if the adverse possessor hit the ten-year

151. Compare S.B. 93, 23rd Leg. (as introduced, Feb. 28, 2003), with 2003
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 147.
152. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (2010) (emphasis added).
153. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.10.030(b), 40.17 (2010).
154. 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 147; see also Cowan v. Yeisley, 255 P.3d 966,
973 (Alaska 2011) (holding the changes to section 09.10.030 are not
retrospective).
155. See Cowan, 255 P.3d at 974.
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mark after July 17, 2003, then the record owner has a legal recourse
against the adverse possessor.
A record owner whose land is being claimed by an adverse
possessor may sue at any time to quiet title to the property156 or to eject
the adverse possessor from the property;157 it does not matter how long
the adverse possessor has been there.158 Beyond recordation, the only
requirement is that the record owner or her predecessor in interest must
have been seized or possessed159 of the property at some point before the
lawsuit is filed.160 So, suppose in the future Mary buys a piece of land in
rural Alaska sight unseen, and she records her deed. One day she
decides to visit, and she discovers that Fred and his family have built a
cabin on the land and have been living there for the past fifty years.
Assume that Fred did not possess for ten years prior to 2003. Because
Mary owns a fee interest, she has been constructively “seized” of the
land in question.161 Therefore, Mary can have a court kick Fred off the
property.
Section 09.45.052 provides the only exceptions under which an
adverse possessor can acquire title to property good against the record
owner and his successors.162 Senate Bill 93 changed section 09.45.052(a)
as follows:
Sec. 09.45.052. Adverse Possession.
(a) The uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real
property under color and claim of title for seven years or more,
or the uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real property for
10 years or more because of a good faith but mistaken belief that the
real property lies within the boundaries of adjacent real property
owned by the adverse claimant, is conclusively presumed to give

156. Quiet title suits are filed under ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.010 (2010).
157. Ejectment suits are filed under ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.630 (2010).
158. Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “Although the pre-2003 [§
09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes] purported only to bar a remedy, this court has
stated that it can be the basis for a new title. The Legislature’s 2003 revisions
essentially abolished the bar on the original landowner’s remedy and were
intended to prevent adverse possession under this statute.” Cowan, 255 P.3d at
973 n.23 (internal citations omitted).
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. Presumably “seized or possessed” means
the same thing in section 09.10.030(b) as it does in subsection (a).
160. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(b) (2010).
161. See discussion supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text.
162. See Cowan, 255 P.3d at 973 (“The net effect of [the 2003 revisions] was to
limit Alaskans’ adverse possession claims to cases where the claimant had either
color of title or a good faith but mistaken belief that the claimant owned the land
in question.”).
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title to the property except as against the state or the United
States.163
Section 09.45.052(a) still “conclusively” gives title to adverse possessors
who have color of title and uninterruptedly, adversely, and notoriously
possess property for at least seven years. In addition, section 09.45.052(a)
now “conclusively” gives title to adverse possessors who have
uninterruptedly, adversely, and notoriously possessed property
adjacent to their own under a good faith but mistaken belief that it lies
within the boundaries of their property.164 The same language that has
applied to color of title cases throughout Alaska’s history now applies to
good faith boundary-line mistakes. Consequently, once an adverse
possessor has proven a good faith boundary mistake, for the reasons
discussed in Part II.B.3, continuous, uninterrupted, and hostile are the
only other elements the adverse possessor should have to prove in order
to get title.
Senate Bill 93 further amended section 09.45.052 by adding a new
subsection allowing public utilities to acquire prescriptive easements.165
With language similar to section 09.45.052(a), section 09.45.052(c) reads:
“Notwithstanding [section 09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes], the
uninterrupted adverse notorious use of real property by a public utility
for utility purposes for a period of 10 years or more vests in that utility
an easement in that property for that purpose.”166 Although the word
“conclusively” is not used, the listed elements are likely the only
elements required, since exclusivity is the only other element employed
by the Alaska Supreme Court,167 and it is not required to establish
easements by prescription.168
Finally, section 09.45.052 was amended to add a new subsection
reading:
(d) Notwithstanding [section 09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes],
the uninterrupted adverse notorious use, including
construction, management, operation, or maintenance, of
private land for public transportation or public access
purposes, including highways, streets, roads, or trails, by the
public, the state, or a political subdivision of the state, for a

163. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
164. The most obvious example of such possession is when a landowner has
long considered a fence to be located on the boundary of her property, but the
actual boundary is a few feet inside the fence.
165. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(c) (2010).
166. Id.
167. See supra Part II.B.2.
168. See supra note 125.
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period of 10 years or more, vests an appropriate interest in that
land in the state or a political subdivision of the state.169
Section 09.45.052(d) gives the state a right to private land when the
public or state has used it continuously, adversely, and notoriously for
ten years or more for public transportation or access purposes. The word
“use” seems to suggest that the state would acquire an easement.
However, unlike section 09.45.052(c), section 09.45.052(d) does not
mention easements; rather, it says that the state will acquire “an
appropriate interest,” suggesting the state could acquire an interest
greater than an easement. Regardless, section 09.45.052(d) provides state
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, the ability to
acquire rights to roads. In addition, subsection (d) might also provide
the public with the continued ability to acquire something akin to a
public prescriptive easement. In a House Judiciary Committee meeting,
Jon Tillinghast, legal counsel for Sealaska Corporation, stated that “the
terms ‘trails’ and ‘public access purposes’ [in section 09.45.052(d)] were
used to specifically preserve the rights of the state and municipalities to
acquire access across private lands in order to reach public-use areas
and public trails.”170 So, if members of the public used a trail on private
land for “public access purposes,” such as accessing a public beach, and
the use was continuous, hostile, and notorious, the state or a political
subdivision of the state would acquire an interest in the land. In this
case, there is no logical reason why the public would not have a
continued right to use the trail.

IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISIONS
A.

Prescriptive Easements and the Alaska Supreme Court’s Decision
in Hansen v. Davis

One of the biggest concerns left unaddressed as Senate Bill 93
traveled through the Alaska Legislature was how it would affect private
prescriptive easements.171 In 2009 the Alaska Supreme Court decided the
prescriptive easement case of Hansen v. Davis.172 The Hansens and
Davises lived on adjacent lots in Ketchikan.173 When the Davises bought
their property in 1984, their grantor, Rodgers, reserved an easement
across their lot. Rodgers never used the easement, and the Davises

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(d) (2010).
See 5/18/03 Minutes II, supra note 14 (statement of Jon Tillinghast).
See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text.
220 P.3d 911 (Alaska 2009).
Id. at 913.
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maintained a garden in the easement for many years.174 In 2006 the
Hansens bought an adjacent lot, and in 2007 the Hansens purchased
Rodgers’s easement.175 Then they disassembled the Davises’ gardening
materials, built a road, and began installation of water and sewer
lines.176 The Davises sued for trespass and damages.177 In their
complaint, the Davises argued that their adverse use of the easement
had extinguished it.178 The superior court ruled in favor of the Davises,
and the Hansens appealed.179
Prior to its decision in Hansen, the Alaska Supreme Court had not
decided whether an easement could be extinguished by prescription.180
The court stated that sections 09.10.030(a) and 09.45.052 of the Alaska
Statutes govern the acquisition of real property rights via adverse
possession and the creation of easements by prescription. However, it
stated that the statutes do not address whether easements can be
extinguished by prescription.181
The Hansens argued that, in light of the 2003 amendments,
extinguishing easements by prescription is contrary to the public policy
of Alaska.182 The court disagreed. It stated:
In amending the statutes governing adverse possession, the
Alaska Legislature increased the burden that a litigant bears in
proving adverse possession of another’s land. But it did not
eliminate adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims
altogether. We find no support for such a categorical rule
allowing easement holders to seek redress for violations of
their rights in an easement in perpetuity. Instead, we follow the
approach adopted by . . . many jurisdictions and hold that an
easement can be extinguished by prescription.183

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 913–14.
177. Id. at 914.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 914–15.
180. Id. at 915.
181. Id. This statement is a bit puzzling, since section 09.10.030(a) no more
explicitly speaks to title by adverse possession or the creation of easements by
prescription than it does to the extinguishment of easements by prescription.
Since the basis for the Davises’ claim that the Hansens’ easement had been
extinguished and thus no longer burdened their land was the prescriptive
period provided in section 09.10.030(a), it is not correct to consider Hansen as
raising a purely common law issue.
182. Hansen, 220 P.3d at 915.
183. Id. at 915–16.
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Nevertheless, the court ruled in favor of the Hansens.184 It noted
that in contrast to a typical adverse possession or user claimant, the
Davises, as owners of the servient estate, already had a right to use the
area burdened by the easement.185 Consequently, the court held that in
order to have crossed the line from permissive to hostile, the Davises’
use must have “unreasonably interfere[d] with the current or
prospective use of the easement by the easement holder.”186 The court
held that the burden on servient estate owners to prove unreasonable
interference is high—a rule it considered consistent with the 2003
amendments’ goal of curtailing but not abolishing adverse possession.187
Applying its rule to the facts, the court held that the Davises’
construction of a garden was not “sufficiently adverse to commence the
prescriptive period.”188
Had the court considered the question in Hansen to be within the
purview of section 09.10.030, the source of the prescriptive period, the
court might have noticed that the pre-2003 version of section 09.10.030
applied, since the alleged ten-plus years of adverse use by the Davises
took place prior to 2003.189 An interesting question left unanswered by
Hansen is what the result would be if the Davises established the
elements necessary to extinguish the easement under the new statute.
For example, suppose the Hansens record the deed granting them
Rodgers’s easement, but they give up trying to use the easement. In
2015, the Davises build a brick wall. Assume, arguendo, that the wall
“unreasonably interferes” with the Hansens’ use of the easement. In
2030, the Hansens decide they want to use the easement. The Hansens
have never been “seized or possessed” of the easement, since one cannot
be “seized or possessed” of an easement within the meaning of the
statute.190 Therefore, they cannot sue under section 09.10.030(b) to quiet
title to the easement. Consequently, although an owner of a servient
estate must meet a high burden to prove an easement has been
extinguished by prescription, the easement holder should not rely on
section 09.10.030(b) to protect his interest.
Another interesting question unanswered by Hansen is whether
private easements can still be created by prescription. According to the
language of section 09.10.030, practically speaking they cannot. Section

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 918.
Id. at 916.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 917.
Id.
See id at 913–14; supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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09.10.030(a) was unchanged by the 2003 amendments,191 and as noted by
the court in Hansen, it is 09.10.030(a) that “constitutes a method for
establishing an easement through prescription.”192 Therefore, according
to section 09.10.030(a), a private prescriptive easement can still be
created when a use is continuous, hostile, and open.193 However, section
09.10.030(b) gives the record owner recourse against the prescriptive
easement holder. The record owner’s recorded interest is not in the
easement itself, since the easement did not exist prior to its creation by
prescription. However, the record owner’s recorded interest is in the
“real property in question.”194 If the record owner was “seized or
possessed” of the property in question before the commencement of the
lawsuit and her ownership interest is recorded, section 09.10.030(b)
seems to provide that the record owner may sue at any time in order to
quiet title to the property or eject the easement holder.
It was almost certainly the goal of the legislature to curtail, if not
abolish, private prescriptive easements.195 If the courts afford record
owners the protections of section 09.10.030(b) where private easements
are concerned, the ability to create easements by prescription will be
drastically curtailed,196 which could result in users having to pay record
owners for easement rights. However, it is worth noting that other
means of creating easements, such as by implication197 or necessity,198

191. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(a) (2010), with ALASKA STAT. §
09.10.030 (2002).
192. Hansen, 220 P.3d at 915 n.5.
193. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
194. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(b) (2010).
195. If the legislature thought that the creation of prescriptive easements
would be unaffected by Senate Bill 93, then there would have been no reason to
preface sections 09.45.052(c) and (d) of the Alaska Statutes—permitting public
prescriptive easements—with “Notwithstanding [section 09.10.030 of the Alaska
Statutes].” See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(c), (d) (2010); accord 4/16/03 Minutes,
supra note 6 (statement of Jon Tillinghast) (“[F]rom now on, if one wants to drive
across another person’s property, the person will have to pay for it.”); 3/11/03
Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Amy Seitz) (stating a Legislative Legal and
Research Services’ attorney believed prescriptive easements were included in
the Senate Bill 93); see also supra notes 165–170 and accompanying text.
196. A person could have color of title to an easement, in which case a
permanent right to the easement could be acquired under section 09.52.045(a) of
the Alaska Statutes.
197. An implied easement arises when, at the time of a sale or conveyance of
a portion of someone’s land, there is a quasi easement that is continuous,
apparent, and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained or
conveyed. Williams v. Fagnani, 175 P.3d 38, 40 (Alaska 2007).
198. An easement by necessity arises when a grantor conveys a portion of his
land and that land is landlocked. In such a case, an access will be created across
the grantor’s land, and it will exist for as long as the necessity continues.
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are unaffected by the 2003 amendments and will apply to some
landowners who need access to and from their land.
B.

The Importance of Recording

To be able to rely on section 09.10.030(b), the true owner of a piece
of property must record his interest. Thus, the 2003 revisions to Alaska’s
adverse possession statutes mean that property owners now have an
additional reason to record, though neither section 09.10.030 or Alaska’s
recording act impose any time constraints on when an owner must
record.199 For example, suppose a true owner acquired his right to a
piece of property via will, intestacy, or an adverse possession judicial
decree issued under the old law. If he did not record his interest,200
subsection (b) would not offer him any protections. This preference for
recording makes some sense. One of the frequently cited purposes of
adverse possession law is to clear titles to land and give third parties
some assurance of who the owner of a piece of property is.201 If the “true
owner” can oust an adverse possessor at any time, then it makes sense to
require true owners to have a recorded interest so that third parties have
a means of ascertaining who the true owner is.
C.

Good Faith Squatters

The goal of the 2003 revisions was to eliminate “bad faith
squatters” from having the ability to adversely possess land. In a Senate
Judiciary meeting, Jon Tillinghast stated that Senate Bill 93 “only deals
with bad faith adverse possession where a person has no written
instrument whatsoever on which to base his claim.”202 In Mr.
Tillinghast’s view, it seems that good faith adverse possession involves

Freightways Terminal Co. v. Indus. & Commercial Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d 977,
984 n. 16 (Alaska 1963).
199. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(b) (2010). Nothing in section 09.10.030
appears to prevent a record owner from recording his interest the day before
commencing a lawsuit against an adverse possessor. See ALASKA STAT. §
09.10.030(b) (2010).
200. Nothing in Alaska’s recording act prevents property owners who took
via will, intestacy, or some means other than a contract for sale from recording.
See ALASKA STAT. § 40.17.010, § 40.17.110 (2010). However, those who take via
will or intestacy often do not record.
201. See, e.g., Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Alaska 1977)
(stating that statutes of limitation and adverse possession law ensure that “title
to land . . . not long be in doubt . . . and that third persons who come to regard
the occupant as owner may be protected” (quoting Stoebuck, supra note 24, at
53)).
202. 4/16/03 Minutes, supra note 6 (statement of Jon Tillinghast).
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deeds: either the adverse possessor has a deed but makes a mistake
about where a boundary line is located, or he has color of title.203
However, the 2003 revisions left open the possibility that some good
faith adverse possessors might have no legal recourse. For example,
suppose Mary buys a piece of land in an undeveloped place. She goes
onto the land she believes is described in the deed, builds a cabin, and
lives there for thirty years. However, Mary misread the deed, which
actually describes land two parcels over from the parcel on which Mary
made her home. Mary acted in good faith, but she does not have color of
title to the land on which she built her cabin.204 Mary also does not
mistakenly believe that the property on which she is living lies within
the bounds of adjacent property that she also owns. Consequently, the
record owner can sue to have Mary ejected.

CONCLUSION
There is no strong evidence that there was a pressing need for the
2003 amendments to Alaska’s adverse possession law because bad faith
adverse possession was out of control. Nevertheless, in recent years
many commentators have argued that adverse possession should be
curtailed because many of the traditional purposes of adverse
possession are now served by other areas of property law, and some
states have taken steps to curtail it because of perceived inequities. In
limiting the scope of its adverse possession law, Alaska could have
adopted one of the approaches being tried by other states, such as
imposing a good faith belief-in-ownership requirement205 or requiring
that adverse possessors pay the property taxes.206 Alternatively, it might
have tried one of the approaches suggested by legal scholars, such as
exempting wild lands from adverse possession.207 Instead, Alaska
elected to try an approach not tried by any other state. Alaska’s 2003
amendments went further than any other state has gone in curtailing the
application of adverse possession. Alaska is now serving as “a
laboratory for the improvement of laws,” and over time, Alaska’s
experience will likely illuminate whether there was some important

203. See id.
204. See Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 780 (Alaska 2000) (holding color of
title requires that the writing describe the land being adversely claimed).
205. Colorado and Oregon have such a requirement. See supra note 27.
206. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-210 (West 2010). Jon Tillinghast of
Sealaska suggested in a House Judiciary meeting that this option would not
work for Alaska because much of the remote land in Alaska is not taxed. 5/18/03
Minutes I, supra note 149 (statement of Jon Tillinghast).
207. Sprankling, supra note 26, at 863.
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purpose for the traditional adverse possession doctrine, or whether it
truly should be a relic of the past.

